الكربون نظام التداول الأوروبي


استخدام الائتمانات الدولية.


والائتمانات الدولية هي أدوات مالية تمثل طنا من ثاني أكسيد الكربون يزيل أو يقل من الغلاف الجوي نتيجة لمشروع خفض الانبعاثات.


وفي الوقت الراهن، تنشأ الائتمانات الدولية من خلال آليتين أنشئتا بموجب بروتوكول كيوتو. هؤلاء هم:


آلية التنمية النظيفة (سدم) - السماح للبلدان الصناعية مع التزام خفض غازات الدفيئة (تسمى بلدان الملحق 1) للاستثمار في المشاريع التي تقلل الانبعاثات في البلدان النامية كبديل لتخفيضات الانبعاثات الأكثر تكلفة في بلدانهم التنفيذ المشترك - مما يسمح للبلدان الصناعية بالوفاء بجزء من التخفيضات المطلوبة في انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة عن طريق دفع تكاليف المشاريع التي تقلل الانبعاثات في البلدان الصناعية الأخرى.


وينص التنفيذ المشترك على إنشاء وحدات خفض الانبعاثات، في حين تنص آلية التنمية النظيفة على إنشاء تخفيضات معتمدة في الانبعاثات (سيرس).


وقد وضع اتفاق باريس آلية سوق جديدة لتحل محل آلية التنمية النظيفة و الجماعة الإسلامية بعد عام 2020.


استخدام الائتمانات الدولية في المرحلة 3 من إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي.


ويمكن للمشاركين في نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لانبعاثات الانبعاثات (إتس) استخدام الائتمانات الدولية من آلية التنمية النظيفة و الجماعة الإسلامية من أجل الوفاء بجزء من التزاماتهم بموجب إتس الأوروبي حتى عام 2020، رهنا بالقيود النوعية والكمية.


وباعتبارها أكبر سوق للكربون في العالم، فإن الاتحاد الأوروبي لتكنولوجيا المعلومات هو حاليا أكبر مصدر للطلب على الائتمانات الدولية، مما يجعله المحرك الرئيسي لسوق الكربون الدولي والمزود الرئيسي لاستثمار الطاقة النظيفة في البلدان النامية والاقتصادات التي تمر بمرحلة انتقالية.


القيود النوعية.


يتم قبول القروض من جميع أنواع المشاريع، باستثناء.


ومشاريع مشاريع الطاقة النووية في مجال التحريج أو إعادة التحريج التي تنطوي على تدمير الغازات الصناعية (مركب الكربون الهيدروفلوري - 23 وأكسيد النيتروز).


ولا يمكن قبول القروض من المشاريع الكهرمائية التي تتجاوز 20 ميغاواط من الطاقة المركبة إلا في ظروف معينة.


وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، يحظر استخدام الاعتمادات / وحدات خفض الانبعاثات المعتمدة الجديدة بعد عام 2018، ما لم يكن المشروع مسجلا في أحد أقل البلدان نموا.


القيود الكمية.


تحدد تشريعات الاتحاد الأوروبي الحدود القصوى التي يمكن للمشغلين بموجب إتس إتحاد الأوروبي استخدام الائتمانات الدولية المؤهلة للامتثال في المرحلة 2 والمرحلة 3.


وتحدد الدول الأعضاء الاستحقاقات الائتمانية الدولية الأولية لكل مشارك في نظام المرحلتين 2 و 3 مجتمعة، ثم توافق عليها اللجنة وفقا للتشريعات ذات الصلة.


واستخدم المشاركون في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي 1.058 مليار طن من الاعتمادات الدولية في المرحلة 2 (2008-2018). وقد نقلت الاستحقاقات غير المستخدمة إلى المرحلة 3 (2018-2020).


تبادل الاعتمادات.


ومنذ المرحلة الثالثة، لم تعد وحدات خفض الانبعاثات المعتمدة ووحدات خفض الإنبعاثات تعد وحدات امتثال داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي للاتصالات الأوروبية ويجب تبادلها للحصول على بدلات الاتحاد الأوروبي. ويتعين على المشغلين أن يطلبوا تبادل وحدات خفض الانبعاثات المعتمدة ووحدات خفض الانبعاثات للبدلات حتى حدود استحقاقهم الفردية المحددة في السجل.


وكان لا بد من تبادل الاعتمادات الصادرة فيما يتعلق بخفض الانبعاثات في فترة الالتزام الأولى لبروتوكول كيوتو (2008-2018) بدلات الاتحاد الأوروبي بحلول 31 آذار / مارس 2018.


استخدام الائتمان الدولي في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي بعد عام 2020.


ويملك الاتحاد الأوروبي هدفا محليا للحد من الانبعاثات ولا يتوخى حاليا مواصلة استخدام الائتمانات الدولية بعد عام 2020.


ومع ذلك، من المهم أن يضع اتفاق باريس أحكاما بشأن استخدام الأسواق لتوفير إطار واضح وقوي لربط أسواق الكربون في المستقبل.


وتنص المادة 6 من الاتفاق على ما يلي:


قواعد المحاسبة التي تتطلب من الأطراف تطبيق قواعد محاسبية قوية على النهج التي تنطوي على استخدام "نتائج التخفيف المحولة دوليا" نحو المساهمات المحددة على الصعيد الوطني. وسوف تمكن هذه القواعد من ربط الخطط مع ضمان سلامة الالتزامات. آلية للتخفيف من الآثار تحل محل الآليات القائمة (مثل آلية التنمية النظيفة و الجماعة الإسلامية)، وتتيح إصدار شهادات بشأن تخفيضات الانبعاثات لاستخدامها في التزامات محددة وطنيا. ومن شأن ذلك أن يسهل المشاركة في أسواق الكربون الدولية على أساس مساهمة محددة في التخفيف.


وسيتعين تنفيذ هذه الأحكام من خلال تنفيذ القرارات على مدى السنوات المقبلة. وفي الوقت الذي تستفيد فيه البلدان من الخبرة، ستحتاج إلى أن تتكيف مع السياق الجديد الذي تقدم فيه جميع البلدان مساهمات، ولكن هناك مجموعة متنوعة من أنواع المساهمات.


أهلية الائتمانات الدولية.


08/11/2018 - لائحة المفوضية رقم 1123/2018 بشأن تحديد الاستحقاقات الائتمانية الدولية 07/06/2018 - لائحة المفوضية رقم (يو) رقم 550/2018 بشأن تحديد بعض القيود المطبقة على استخدام الائتمانات الدولية من مشروعات الغازات الصناعية القوائم الإیجابیة والسلبیة قائمة الإیجابیة العامة قائمة سلبية عامة مذکرة تفسیریة علی قوائم الائتمان (47 کیلو بایت) القواعد المنسقة المتعلقة بمشروعات السد الکبیرة الکبیرة 27/10/2004 - التوجیھ 2004/101 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس المعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك فيما يتعلق بآليات مشروع بروتوكول كيوتو المبادئ التوجيهية بشأن تطبيق المادة 11 (ب) 6 من التوجيه 2004/101 / إيك (55 كب) استبيان امتثال المشروع (75 كيلوبايت)


آلية سوق جديدة / إصلاح آلية التنمية النظيفة / الجماعة الإسلامية.


دراسات.


افتح جميع الأسئلة.


الأهلية.


هل يمكنني استخدام ائتمانات دولية للامتثال في المرحلة 3 من إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي؟ اي واحدة؟


نعم، رهنا بالقيود الكمية والنوعية. وهذا يعني أنه اعتبارا من 1 نيسان / أبريل 2018، فإن الائتمانات الدولية فقط من المشاريع المسجلة في أقل البلدان نموا بعد عام 2018 هي مؤهلة للاستخدام في الاتحاد الأوروبي للإنبعاثات، باستثناء الاعتمادات من مشاريع الطاقة النووية ومشاريع التحريج وإعادة التحريج (لوتف) والمشاريع التي تشمل وتدمير الغازات الصناعية (هفك-23 و N2O). ولا يمكن قبول القروض من المشاريع الكهرمائية التي تتجاوز 20 ميغاواط من الطاقة المركبة إلا في ظروف معينة. وعلاوة على ذلك، يجب تبادل الاعتمادات الدولية للحصول على بدلات الاتحاد الأوروبي قبل أن يمكن استخدامها للامتثال في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي. وكان لا بد من تبادل الاعتمادات الصادرة فيما يتعلق بخفض الانبعاثات في فترة الالتزام الأولى لبروتوكول كيوتو (2008-2018) بدلات الاتحاد الأوروبي بحلول الموعد النهائي المحدد في 31 آذار / مارس 2018.


ماذا يحدث إذا فقد بلد ما وضع أقل البلدان نموا؟


وقد يستمر مشروع في بلد من أقل البلدان نموا مدرج في قائمة أقل البلدان نموا في الأمم المتحدة عندما يسجل المشروع من قبل المجلس التنفيذي لآلية التنمية النظيفة في توليد الائتمانات حتى عام 2020، أيا كان ما يحدث لقائمة الأمم المتحدة من أقل البلدان نموا.


كيف يتم تتبع ومراقبة القيود النوعية؟


ويتم تتبع القيود النوعية والتحكم فيها من خلال إدخال عمليات التحقق الأوتوماتي في سجل الاتحاد استنادا إلى المعلومات المتعلقة بهوية المشروع ومعرف فترة الالتزام بالائتمانات الدولية ذات الصلة.


هل هناك مقترحات أخرى قيد النظر لتطبيق قيود نوعية على أي نوع محدد من المشاريع؟


وينص توجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية (إتس) على فرض قيود على الاستخدام كجزء من الأحكام المنفذة للائتمانات التي يمكن استخدامها على نحو آخر خلال المرحلة 3 من إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي. وبينما يسمح التشريع بوضع قيود إضافية على الاستخدام، فإن المفوضية الأوروبية لا تنظر حاليا في أي قيود إضافية على الاستخدام في المرحلة الثالثة. ومع ذلك، فإن هدف الاتحاد الأوروبي لعام 2030 المحلي لا يتوخى حاليا مواصلة استخدام الائتمانات الدولية بعد عام 2020.


تبادل الاعتمادات الدولية للبدلات.


كيف سيعمل التبادل؟


ويرد وصف مفصل لعملية التبادل في لائحة قلم المحكمة (المادة 59-61). يمكن لممثل الحساب أن يطلب تبادل الأرصدة الدولية المؤهلة من حساب حجز المشغل أو حساب مشغل الطائرات في سجل الاتحاد. ویجب أن یوافق علی طلب التبادل شخص ثان یتم ترشیحھ کممثل إضافي للحساب، أو إذا لم یکن ھناك ممثل حساب إضافي یتم ترشیحھ للحساب، من قبل ممثل حساب ثان مختلف عن الشخص الذي بدأ الطلب. وتتم عملية التبادل الآلي: فبعد تحويل الأرصدة الدولية إلى حساب مركزي، سينقل عدد مكافئ من البدلات تلقائيا إلى الحساب الذي طلب منه التبادل.


ويمكن للمشغل أن يطلب أكبر عدد ممكن من عمليات تبادل الاعتمادات للبدلات حسب الحاجة، شريطة ألا يتجاوز ذلك استحقاقه الائتماني الدولي. وتتضمن جداول الاستحقاقات الائتمانية الدولية الاستحقاقات المحسوبة لكل تركيب ومشغل للطائرات حسب إحصائيات الأعضاء وفقا للقواعد المتعلقة باستحقاقات الائتمان الدولية. ويمكن أن تتم عملية التبادل في أي وقت خلال السنة التقويمية. وحالما يتم تبادل الأرصدة للبدلات، لا يمكن استبدالها بالائتمانات.


تنقيح المرحلة 4 (2021-2030)


قدمت المفوضية الأوروبية في يوليو 2018 اقتراحا تشريعيا لمراجعة نظام تداول الانبعاثات في الاتحاد الأوروبي (إتس) للفترة بعد عام 2020.


هذه هي الخطوة الأولى في تحقيق هدف الاتحاد الأوروبي للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنسبة 40٪ على الأقل محليا بحلول عام 2030 بما يتماشى مع إطار سياسة المناخ والطاقة لعام 2030 وكجزء من مساهمته في اتفاق باريس.


زيادة وتيرة خفض الانبعاثات.


ولتحقيق هدف الاتحاد الأوروبي بنسبة 40٪ على الأقل، يتعين على القطاعات التي تغطيها إتس خفض انبعاثاتها بنسبة 43٪ مقارنة بعام 2005.


ولهذه الغاية، سينخفض ​​العدد الإجمالي لبدلات الانبعاثات بمعدل سنوي قدره 2.2٪ اعتبارا من عام 2021 فصاعدا، مقارنة بنسبة 1.74٪ حاليا.


وهذا يمثل خفضا إضافيا للانبعاثات في القطاعات التي تغطيها إتس حوالي 556 مليون طن على مدى العقد - أي ما يعادل الانبعاثات السنوية للمملكة المتحدة.


أفضل استهداف قواعد تسرب الكربون.


ويضع المقترح أيضا قواعد يمكن التنبؤ بها وقوية ونزيهة للتصدي لخطر تسرب الكربون.


إعادة النظر في نظام التوزيع المجاني للتركيز على القطاعات الأكثر عرضة لخطر نقل إنتاجها خارج الاتحاد الأوروبي - حوالي 50 قطاعا في المجموع عدد كبير من البدلات المجانية المخصصة للمنشآت الجديدة والمتنامية قواعد أكثر مرونة لتحسين مواءمة مبلغ البدلات المجانية مع أرقام الإنتاج تحديث للمعايير التي تعكس التقدم التكنولوجي منذ عام 2008.


ومن المتوقع تخصيص حوالي 6.3 بلايين من البدلات مجانا للشركات خلال الفترة 2021-2030.


تمويل الابتكار منخفض الكربون وتحديث قطاع الطاقة.


وسيتم إنشاء العديد من آليات الدعم لمساعدة الصناعة وقطاعات الطاقة على مواجهة تحديات الابتكار والاستثمار في الانتقال إلى اقتصاد منخفض الكربون.


وهي تشمل صندوقين جديدين:


صندوق االبتكار - توسيع نطاق الدعم القائم من أجل إظهار التكنولوجيات المبتكرة لتحقيق االبتكار في صندوق التحديث الصناعي - تسهيل االستثمارات في تحديث قطاع الطاقة وأنظمة الطاقة األوسع وتعزيز كفاءة الطاقة في 10 دول أعضاء منخفضة الدخل.


وستظل البدلات المجانية متاحة أيضا لتحديث قطاع الطاقة في هذه الدول الأعضاء ذات الدخل المنخفض.


مدخلات أصحاب المصلحة.


وشارك أصحاب المصلحة في مراحل مختلفة في تطوير هذا الاقتراح.


وأجريت مشاورات واسعة النطاق في عام 2018، بما في ذلك.


وعقب هذه المشاورات وتحليل أهداف سياسة المناخ للاتحاد الأوروبي لعام 2030، أجرت اللجنة تقييما للأثر.


وقدم الاقتراح التشريعي إلى البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس واللجنة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية ولجنة الأقاليم لمواصلة النظر فيه بموجب الإجراء التشريعي العادي.


وكان للجمهور إمكانية تقديم تعليقات بشأن الاقتراح التشريعي بعد اعتماده من قبل المفوضية الأوروبية. ووردت ردود فعل من 85 من أصحاب المصلحة وقدم موجز إلى البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي.


نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات (الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس)


وأوضح نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات.


ويعتبر نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات) إيتس (حجر الزاوية في سياسة االتحاد األوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ وأداة رئيسية للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة من حيث التكلفة. هذا هو أول سوق الكربون الرئيسي في العالم ولا يزال أكبر واحد.


تعمل في 31 دولة (جميع دول الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 28 دولة بالإضافة إلى أيسلندا وليختنشتاين والنرويج) تحد من الانبعاثات من أكثر من 11000 منشأة تستخدم الطاقة الثقيلة (محطات توليد الكهرباء والمنشآت الصناعية) وتغطي شركات الطيران العاملة بين هذه الدول حوالي 45٪ من غازات الدفيئة في الاتحاد الأوروبي الانبعاثات.


للحصول على نظرة عامة مفصلة، ​​انظر:


A 'كاب والتجارة' النظام.


تعمل إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي على مبدأ "الحد والتجارة".


يتم تحديد سقف على إجمالي كمية غازات الدفيئة معينة التي يمكن أن تنبعث من المنشآت التي يغطيها النظام. ويتم تخفيض الحد الأقصى بمرور الوقت بحيث ينخفض ​​إجمالي الانبعاثات.


وفي إطار الحد الأقصى، تتلقى الشركات أو تشتري بدلات الانبعاثات التي يمكن أن تتاجر بها مع بعضها البعض حسب الحاجة. ويمكنهم أيضا شراء كميات محدودة من القروض الدولية من مشاريع إنقاذ الانبعاثات في جميع أنحاء العالم. ويضمن الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات المتاحة أن يكون لها قيمة.


وبعد كل سنة، يجب على الشركة أن تسلم ما يكفي من البدلات لتغطية جميع انبعاثاتها، وإلا فرضت غرامات كبيرة. وإذا خفضت الشركة انبعاثاتها، فإنها يمكن أن تحتفظ بدلات احتياطية لتغطية احتياجاتها المستقبلية أو أن تبيعها إلى شركة أخرى تقل عن المخصصات.


فالتجارة تجلب المرونة التي تضمن خفض الانبعاثات حيث تكلف أقل من ذلك. كما يعزز سعر الكربون القوي الاستثمار في التكنولوجيات النظيفة والمنخفضة الكربون.


الملامح الرئيسية للمرحلة 3 (2018-2020)


وقد أصبح الاتحاد الأوروبي للاتصالات الأوروبية الآن في مرحلته الثالثة - يختلف كثيرا عن المرحلتين 1 و 2.


التغييرات الرئيسية هي:


يتم تطبيق سقف واحد على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي على الانبعاثات بدلا من النظام السابق للقبعات الوطنية يعتبر المزاد هو الطريقة الافتراضية لتخصيص البدلات (بدلا من التخصيص المجاني)، وتنطبق قواعد التوزيع المنسقة على البدلات التي لا تزال تمنح مجانا. تضمنت الغازات 300 مليون بدلات خصصت في احتياطي المشردين الجدد لتمويل نشر تكنولوجيات مبتكرة للطاقة المتجددة واحتجاز الكربون وتخزينه من خلال برنامج 300 نر.


القطاعات والغازات المشمولة.


ويغطي النظام القطاعات والغازات التالية مع التركيز على الانبعاثات التي يمكن قياسها والإبلاغ عنها والتحقق منها بمستوى عال من الدقة:


من ثاني أكسيد الكربون (CO2) من قطاعات توليد الطاقة والطاقة الحرارية كثيفة الاستخدام للطاقة بما في ذلك مصافي النفط والأعمال الحديدية وإنتاج الحديد والألمنيوم والمعادن والاسمنت والجير والزجاج والسيراميك ولب الورق والورق والكرتون والأحماض والمواد الكيميائية العضوية السائبة أكسيد النيتروز التجاري (N 2 O) من إنتاج أحماض النيتريك والأديبيك والجليوكسيليك ومركبات الكربون الهيدروكلورية فلورية غليوكسال (بكس) من إنتاج الألومنيوم.


المشاركة في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي إلزامية للشركات في هذه القطاعات، ولكن.


في بعض القطاعات فقط النباتات فوق حجم معين يتم تضمين بعض المنشآت الصغيرة يمكن استبعادها إذا وضعت الحكومات تدابير مالية أو غيرها من شأنها أن خفض انبعاثاتها من قبل ما يعادلها في قطاع الطيران، حتى عام 2018 ينطبق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي فقط على الرحلات الجوية بين المطارات الواقعة في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية (إيا).


تقديم تخفيضات في الانبعاثات.


وقد أثبتت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي أن وضع سعر على الكربون والتداول في ذلك يمكن أن تعمل. وتنخفض الانبعاثات من المنشآت في المخطط حسب الغرض - بنحو 5٪ مقارنة مع بداية المرحلة 3 (2018) (انظر أرقام 2018).


وفي عام 2020، ستكون الانبعاثات من القطاعات التي يغطيها النظام أقل بنسبة 21 في المائة عما كانت عليه في عام 2005.


تطوير سوق الكربون.


أنشئت في عام 2005، والاتحاد الأوروبي إتس هو أول وأكبر نظام دولي للانبعاثات الانبعاثات في العالم، وهو ما يمثل أكثر من ثلاثة أرباع التجارة الدولية للكربون.


كما تلهم إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي تطوير تجارة الانبعاثات في بلدان ومناطق أخرى. ويهدف الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى ربط إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي مع أنظمة أخرى متوافقة.


التشريعات الرئيسية للاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية.


30/04/2018 - نسخة موحدة من التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي ينشئ خطة لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس رقم 96/61 / إيك 23/04/2009 - التوجيه رقم 2009/29 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق خطة تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في الجماعة 19/11/2008 - التوجيه 2008/101 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك بحيث يشمل أنشطة الطيران في مخطط تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة 27/10/2004 - الأمر التوجيهي 2004/101 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي و المجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الذي ينشئ خطة لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة فيما يتعلق بآليات مشروع بروتوكول كيوتو 13/10/2003 - الأمر التوجيهي 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والاتحاد الأوروبي نيل التي تضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك.


تقارير سوق الكربون.


23/11/2017 - كوم (2017) 693 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 01/02/2017 - كوم (2017) 48 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 18/11/2018 - كوم 2018) 576 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 14/11/2018 - كوم (2018) 652 - حالة سوق الكربون الأوروبي في عام 2018.


تنقيح إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي للمرحلة 3.


04/02/2018 - استنتاجات المجلس الأوروبي المؤرخة 4 شباط / فبراير 2018 (انظر الاستنتاجين 23 و 24) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات بشأن تفسير المرفق الأول لتوجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية (باستثناء أنشطة الطيران) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات ورقة تعريفية لمولدات الكهرباء 06/04/2009 - بيان صحفي صادر عن المجلس حول اعتماد مجموعة المناخ والطاقة 12/12/2008 - استنتاجات رئاسة المجلس الأوروبي (11 و 12 ديسمبر 2008) 12/12/2008 - المجلس الأوروبي بيان بشأن استخدام عائدات المزادات 23/01/2008 - اقتراح بتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس بتعديل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نظام تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في المجتمع 23 / 01/2008 - وثيقة عمل موظفي اللجنة - وثيقة مصاحبة للاقتراح الخاص بتوجيه للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لبدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة - تقييم الأثر.


التنفيذ.


04/07/2018 - مشروع لائحة تنظيمية بشأن تحديد استحقاقات الائتمان الدولي 05/06/2018 - مشروع لائحة بشأن تحديد استحقاقات الائتمان الدولي 05/05/2018 لائحة المفوضية رقم الاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 389/2018 بتاريخ 2 مايو 2018 بشأن إنشاء السجل الاتحادي إلى التوجيه رقم 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، والمرسومين رقم 280/2004 / إيك رقم 406/2009 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وإلغاء لائحة المفوضية الأوروبية رقم 920/2018 و لا 1193/2018 نص ذو صلة بالمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية 18/11/2018 - لائحة اللجنة التي تنشئ سجل الاتحاد لفترة التداول التي تبدأ في 1 يناير 2018 وفترات التداول اللاحقة من مخطط الإتجار في الانبعاثات بالاتحاد وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس، والمقرر 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وتعديل اللائحة التنفيذية رقم 2216/2004 والاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 920/2018 - لم تنشر بعد في الجريدة الرسمية 07 / 10/2018 - كوميسيون ريجول (الاتحاد الأوروبي) رقم 920/2018 لنظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي والقرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - الإصدار بما في ذلك التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018 08/10/2008 - لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 لنظام موحد ومضمون من السجلات وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي - القرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - الإصدار الساري حتى 31 ديسمبر 2018 26/10/2007 - قرار اللجنة المشتركة للمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية رقم 146/2007 الذي يربط الاتحاد الأوروبي بالإنكليزية إتس مع النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين 13/11 / 2006 - قرار اللجنة 2006/780 / إيك بشأن تجنب الازدواجية المزدوجة لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار خطة الجماعة المعنية بتداول الانبعاثات لأنشطة المشاريع بموجب بروتوكول كيوتو عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس (ن) (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - نسخة موحدة من لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 2216/2004 بشأن نظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات معدلة بموجب لائحة المفوضية رقم 916/2007 المؤرخة 31 يوليو / تموز 2007، لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 المؤرخة 8 أكتوبر 2008 ولائحة المفوضية (يو) رقم 920/2018 المؤرخة 7 أكتوبر 2018 - نسخة لا تشمل التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018.


تطبيق ضريبة القيمة المضافة.


التاريخ التشريعي للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك.


العمل قبل اقتراح اللجنة.


08/02/2000 - كوم (2000) 87 - ورقة خضراء بشأن الاتجار بانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار الاتحاد الأوروبي ولاية ونتائج الفريق العامل الأول التابع للجنة إكب: الآليات المرنة 04/09/2001 - المحضر الموجز لاجتماع التشاور مع أصحاب المصلحة (مع الصناعة والمنظمات غير الحكومية البيئية) 19/05/1999 - كوم (1999) 230 - التحضير لتنفيذ بروتوكول كيوتو 03/06/1998 - كوم (1998) 353 - تغير المناخ - نحو استراتيجية ما بعد كيوتو للاتحاد الأوروبي نطاق إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي : 07/2007 - المنشآت الصغيرة داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات 10/2006 - إدراج أنشطة إضافية والغازات في الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ: 12/2006 - النهج إلى الداخلين الجدد والإغلاق 10/2006 - مزاد بدائل انبعاث ثاني أآسيد الكربون في الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس 10/2006 - مواءمة منهجيات التخصيص 12/2006 - تقرير عن القدرة التنافسية الدولية فريق عمل إكب المعني بتداول الانبعاثات في استعراض إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي 15/06/2007 - التقرير النهائي للمي 4 بشأن الربط مع أنظمة تجارة الانبعاثات في الدول الثالثة 22/05/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثالث حول مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ 26/04/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثاني حول الامتثال الصارم وإنفاذ القانون 09/03/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الأول حول نطاق التوجيه.


أكتوبر 2001.


22/01/2002 - ورقة غير رسمية عن أوجه التآزر بين اقتراح المفوضية الأوروبية بشأن الاتجار بالانبعاثات (كوم (2001) 581) وتوجيه الاتفاقية الدولية لوقاية النباتات 23/10/2001 - كوم (2001) 581 - اقتراح بشأن توجيه إطاري لتداول انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة الأوروبية.


رد فعل اللجنة على قراءة الاقتراح في المجلس والبرلمان (بما في ذلك الموقف المشترك للمجلس)


18/07/2003 - كوم (2003) 463 - رأي اللجنة بشأن تعديلات البرلمان الأوروبي على الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اقتراح توجيه البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي 20/06/2003 - كوم (2003) 364 - الاتصال باللجنة إلى البرلمان الأوروبي بشأن الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 18/03/2003 - الموقف المشترك (إيك ) لا 28/2003 - الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 27/11/2002 - كوم (2002) 680 - اقتراح معدل لتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك فاق.


افتح جميع الأسئلة.


أسئلة وأجوبة بشأن نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي المنقح لتداول الانبعاثات (كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2008)


ما هو الهدف من تداول الانبعاثات؟


والهدف من نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات هو مساعدة الدول األعضاء في االتحاد األوروبي على تحقيق التزاماتها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها بطريقة فعالة من حيث التكلفة. والسماح للشركات المشاركة بشراء أو بيع بدلات الانبعاثات يعني أن التخفيضات في الانبعاثات يمكن تحقيقها بأقل تكلفة.


إن إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو حجر الزاوية في استراتيجية الاتحاد الأوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ. وهو أول نظام تجاري دولي لانبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم، وقد بدأ العمل به منذ عام 2005. واعتبارا من الأول من يناير / كانون الثاني 2008، فإنه لا ينطبق فقط على الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 27 دولة، وإنما ينطبق أيضا على الأعضاء الثلاثة الآخرين في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية - النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين. وهي تغطي حاليا أكثر من 000 10 منشأة في قطاعي الطاقة والصناعة وهما مسؤولان جماعيا عن ما يقرب من نصف انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي من ثاني أكسيد الكربون و 40 في المائة من مجموع انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة. وسيؤدي إدخال تعديل على توجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية المتفق عليه في تموز / يوليه 2008 إلى إدراج قطاع الطيران في النظام اعتبارا من عام 2018.


كيف يعمل تداول الانبعاثات؟


و إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو نظام "سقف والتجارة"، وهذا يعني أنه يحد من المستوى العام للانبعاثات المسموح بها ولكن، في حدود هذا، يسمح للمشاركين في النظام لشراء وبيع البدلات كما تتطلب. هذه البدلات هي "عملة" التداول المشتركة في قلب النظام. يمنح أحد البدلات لصاحب الحق الحق في انبعاث طن واحد من ثاني أكسيد الكربون أو ما يعادله من غازات الدفيئة الأخرى. ويؤدي الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات إلى نشوء ندرة في السوق.


وفي فترة التداول الأولى والثانية في إطار هذا المخطط، كان على الدول الأعضاء أن تضع خططا وطنية للتخصيص تحدد المستوى الكلي لانبعاثاتها، وكم عدد البدلات التي تصدرها كل منشأة في بلدها. وفي نهاية كل سنة يجب أن تسلم المنشآت بدلات تعادل انبعاثاتها. ويمكن للشركات التي تبقي انبعاثاتها دون مستوى بدلاتها أن تبيع بدلاتها الزائدة. ويواجه أولئك الذين يواجهون صعوبة في الحفاظ على انبعاثاتهم وفقا لبدلاتهم خيارا بين اتخاذ تدابير للحد من انبعاثاتهم الخاصة - مثل الاستثمار في تكنولوجيا أكثر كفاءة أو استخدام مصادر طاقة أقل كثافة من الكربون - أو شراء البدلات الإضافية التي يحتاجونها في السوق ، أو مزيج من الاثنين. ومن المرجح أن تحدد هذه الخيارات بتكاليف نسبية. وبهذه الطريقة، تخفض الانبعاثات حيثما يكون ذلك أكثر فعالية من حيث التكلفة.


كم من الوقت كان الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس تعمل؟


تم إطلاق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي في 1 يناير 2005. استمرت فترة التداول الأولى لمدة ثلاث سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2007 وكانت مرحلة "التعلم بالممارسة" للتحضير لفترة التداول الثانية الحاسمة. وبدأت فترة التداول الثانية في 1 يناير 2008 وتستمر لمدة خمس سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2018. وتأتي أهمية فترة التداول الثانية من كونها تتزامن مع فترة الالتزام الأولى لبروتوكول كيوتو، يجب على البلدان الصناعية أن تحقق أهدافها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها. وبالنسبة لفترة التداول الثانية، تم تحديد انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنحو 6.5٪ دون مستويات عام 2005 للمساعدة على ضمان أن الاتحاد الأوروبي ككل، والدول الأعضاء على حدة، يفي بالتزامات كيوتو.


ما هي الدروس الرئيسية المستفادة من التجربة حتى الآن؟


وقد وضعت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي سعرا على الكربون وأثبتت أن الاتجار في انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة يعمل. وقد أنشأت فترة التداول الأولى بنجاح التداول الحر لبدلات الانبعاث في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي، ووضعت البنية التحتية اللازمة، ووضعت سوقا ديناميكية للكربون. وقد تكون الفائدة البيئية للمرحلة الأولى محدودة بسبب التوزيع المفرط للبدلات في بعض الدول الأعضاء وبعض القطاعات، ويرجع ذلك أساسا إلى الاعتماد على إسقاطات الانبعاثات قبل أن تصبح بيانات الانبعاثات التي تم التحقق منها متاحة في إطار إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي. وعندما أبرز نشر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة لعام 2005 هذا "الإفراط في تخصيص"، كان رد فعل السوق كما هو متوقع من خلال خفض سعر السوق للبدلات. وقد أتاح توافر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة للجنة أن تكفل تحديد الحد الأقصى للمخصصات الوطنية في إطار المرحلة الثانية على مستوى يؤدي إلى تخفيضات حقيقية في الانبعاثات.


وإلى جانب التأكيد على الحاجة إلى بيانات تم التحقق منها، أثبتت التجربة حتى الآن أن زيادة المواءمة داخل إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي أمر حتمي لضمان أن يحقق الاتحاد الأوروبي أهدافه في خفض الانبعاثات على الأقل بتكلفة وبحد أدنى من التشوهات التنافسية. والحاجة إلى مزيد من المواءمة أوضح فيما يتعلق بكيفية تحديد الحد الأقصى لبدلات الانبعاثات الإجمالية.


وتبين الفترتان التجاريتان الأوليان أيضا أن الطرق الوطنية المختلفة على نطاق واسع لتخصيص البدلات للمنشآت تهدد المنافسة العادلة في السوق الداخلية. وعلاوة على ذلك، هناك حاجة إلى قدر أكبر من المواءمة والتوضيح والتنقيح فيما يتعلق بنطاق النظام، وإمكانية الحصول على ائتمانات من مشاريع خفض الانبعاثات خارج الاتحاد الأوروبي، وشروط ربط النظام الأوروبي لتكنولوجيا الاتصالات بالأنظمة التجارية للانبعاثات في أماكن أخرى، متطلبات تقديم التقارير.


ما هي التغييرات الرئيسية في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي، ومتى سيتم تطبيقها؟


وستطبق التغييرات المتفق عليها للتصميم اعتبارا من فترة التداول الثالثة، أي يناير / كانون الثاني 2018. وبينما ستبدأ الأعمال التحضيرية فورا، لن تتغير القواعد السارية حتى يناير 2018 لضمان الحفاظ على الاستقرار التنظيمي.


وستكون معاهدة التجارة الأوروبية للاتحاد الأوروبي في الفترة الثالثة نظاما أكثر كفاءة وأكثر اتساقا وعدلا.


وتتحقق زيادة الكفاءة من خالل فرتة تداول أطول) 8 سنوات بدال من 5 سنوات (، وخفض انبعاثات قوي ومتراجع سنويا) انخفاض بنسبة 21٪ يف عام 2020 مقارنة بعام 2005 (وزيادة كبرية يف كمية املزادات) من أقل من 4٪ في المرحلة 2 إلى أكثر من النصف في المرحلة 3).


وتم الاتفاق على مزيد من المواءمة في العديد من المجالات، بما في ذلك فيما يتعلق بتحديد الحد الأقصى (وهو سقف على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي بدلا من الحدود الوطنية في المرحلتين 1 و 2) والقواعد المتعلقة بالتخصيص الحر الانتقالي.


وقد ازدادت عدالة النظام زيادة كبيرة من خلال التحرك نحو قواعد التخصيص المجاني على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي للمنشآت الصناعية وبإدخال آلية لإعادة التوزيع تخول للدول الأعضاء الجديدة في المزاد المزيد من البدلات.


كيف يقارن النص النهائي مع اقتراح اللجنة الأولي؟


وقد تم الحفاظ على أهداف المناخ والطاقة التي وافق عليها مجلس الربيع الأوروبي لعام 2007، ولا يزال الهيكل العام لاقتراح اللجنة بشأن إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي سليما. بمعنى أنه سيكون هناك سقف واحد على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي على عدد بدلات الانبعاثات، وسوف ينخفض ​​هذا الحد سنويا على طول خط اتجاه خطى، والذي سيستمر بعد نهاية فترة التداول الثالثة (2018-2020). والفرق الرئيسي مقارنة بالمقترح هو أن مزاد العلاوات سيتم تدريجيا على نحو أبطأ.


ما هي التغييرات الرئيسية مقارنة باقتراح اللجنة؟


وباختصار، فإن التغييرات الرئيسية التي أدخلت على المقترح هي كما يلي:


ويسمح لبعض الدول الأعضاء بانتقاص اختياري ومؤقت من القاعدة التي تنص على عدم تخصيص أي بدلات مجانا لمولدات الكهرباء اعتبارا من عام 2018. ويتاح هذا الخيار للتقييد للدول الأعضاء التي تستوفي شروطا معينة تتعلق بالترابط بين الكهرباء وحصة وقود أحفوري واحد في إنتاج الكهرباء، ونصيب الفرد من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي بالنسبة لمتوسط ​​الاتحاد الأوروبي 27. In addition, the amount of free allowances that a Member State can allocate to power plants is limited to 70% of carbon dioxide emissions of relevant plants in phase 1 and declines in the years thereafter. Furthermore free allocation in phase 3 can only be given to power plants that are operational or under construction no later than end 2008. See reply to question 15 below. There will be more details in the Directive on the criteria to be used to determine the sectors or sub-sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage , and an earlier date of publication of the Commission's list of such sectors (31 December 2009). Moreover, subject to review when a satisfactory international agreement is reached, installations in all exposed industries will receive 100% free allowances to the extent that they use the most efficient technology. The free allocation to industry is limited to the share of these industries' emissions in total emissions in 2005 to 2007. The total number of allowances allocated for free to installations in industry sectors will decline annually in line with the decline of the emissions cap. Member States may also compensate certain installations for CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices if the CO 2 costs might otherwise expose them to the risk of carbon leakage. The Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect. See reply to question 15 below. The level of auctioning of allowances for non-exposed industry will increase in a linear manner as proposed by the Commission, but rather than reaching 100% by 2020 it will reach 70%, with a view to reaching 100% by 2027. As foreseen in the Commission's proposal, 10% of the allowances for auctioning will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. A provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% of auctioned allowances to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. The share of auctioning revenues that Member States are recommended to use to fight and adapt to climate change mainly within the EU, but also in developing countries, is raised from 20% to 50%. The text provides for a top-up to the proposed permitted level of use of JI/CDM credits in the 20% scenario for existing operators that received the lowest budgets to import and use such credits in relation to allocations and access to credits in the period 2008-2018. New sectors, new entrants in the periods 2018-2020 and 2008-2018 will also be able to use credits. The total amount of credits that may be used will, however, not exceed 50% of the reduction between 2008 and 2020. Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement, the Commission could allow additional access to CERs and ERUs for operators in the Community scheme. See reply to question 20 below. The proceeds from auctioning 300 million allowances from the new entrants reserve will be used to support up to 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects and projects demonstrating innovative renewable energy technologies. A number of conditions are attached to this financing mechanism. See reply to question 30 below. The possibility to opt-out small combustion installations provided they are subject to equivalent measures has been extended to cover all small installations irrespective of activity, the emission threshold has been raised from 10,000 to 25,000 tonnes of CO 2 per year, and the capacity threshold that combustion installations have to fulfil in addition has been raised from 25MW to 35MW. With these increased thresholds, the share of covered emissions that would potentially be excluded from the emissions trading system becomes significant, and consequently a provision has been added to allow for a corresponding reduction of the EU-wide cap on allowances.


Will there still be national allocation plans (NAPs)?


No. In their NAPs for the first (2005-2007) and the second (2008-2018) trading periods, Member States determined the total quantity of allowances to be issued – the cap – and how these would be allocated to the installations concerned. This approach has generated significant differences in allocation rules, creating an incentive for each Member State to favour its own industry, and has led to great complexity.


As from the third trading period, there will be a single EU-wide cap and allowances will be allocated on the basis of harmonised rules. National allocation plans will therefore not be needed any more.


How will the emission cap in phase 3 be determined?


The rules for calculating the EU-wide cap are as follows:


From 2018, the total number of allowances will decrease annually in a linear manner. The starting point of this line is the average total quantity of allowances (phase 2 cap) to be issued by Member States for the 2008-12 period, adjusted to reflect the broadened scope of the system from 2018 as well as any small installations that Member States have chosen to exclude. The linear factor by which the annual amount shall decrease is 1.74% in relation to the phase 2 cap.


The starting point for determining the linear factor of 1.74% is the 20% overall reduction of greenhouse gases compared to 1990, which is equivalent to a 14% reduction compared to 2005. However, a larger reduction is required of the EU ETS because it is cheaper to reduce emissions in the ETS sectors. The division that minimises overall reduction cost amounts to:


a 21% reduction in EU ETS sector emissions compared to 2005 by 2020; a reduction of around 10% compared to 2005 for the sectors that are not covered by the EU ETS.


The 21% reduction in 2020 results in an ETS cap in 2020 of a maximum of 1720 million allowances and implies an average phase 3 cap (2018 to 2020) of some 1846 million allowances and a reduction of 11% compared to the phase 2 cap.


All absolute figures indicated correspond to the coverage at the start of the second trading period and therefore don't take account of aviation, which will be added in 2018, and other sectors that will be added in phase 3.


The final figures for the annual emission caps in phase 3 will be determined and published by the Commission by 30 September 2018.


How will the emission cap beyond phase 3 be determined?


The linear factor of 1.74% used to determine the phase 3 cap will continue to apply beyond the end of the trading period in 2020 and will determine the cap for the fourth trading period (2021 to 2028) and beyond. It may be revised by 2025 at the latest. In fact, significant emission reductions of 60%-80% compared to 1990 will be necessary by 2050 to reach the strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature increase to not more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.


An EU-wide cap on emission allowances will be determined for each individual year. Will this reduce flexibility for the installations concerned?


No, flexibility for installations will not be reduced at all. In any year, the allowances to be auctioned and distributed have to be issued by the competent authorities by 28 February. The last date for operators to surrender allowances is 30 April of the year following the year in which the emissions took place. So operators receive allowances for the current year before they have to surrender allowances to cover their emissions for the previous year. Allowances remain valid throughout the trading period and any surplus allowances can now be "banked" for use in subsequent trading periods. In this respect nothing will change.


The system will remain based on trading periods, but the third trading period will last eight years, from 2018 to 2020, as opposed to five years for the second phase from 2008 to 2018.


For the second trading period Member States generally decided to allocate equal total quantities of allowances for each year. The linear decrease each year from 2018 will correspond better to expected emissions trends over the period.


What are the tentative annual ETS cap figures for the period 2018 to 2020?


The tentative annual cap figures are as follows:


These figures are based on the scope of the ETS as applicable in phase 2 (2008 to 2018), and the Commission's decisions on the national allocation plans for phase 2, amounting to 2083 million tonnes. These figures will be adjusted for several reasons. Firstly, adjustment will be made to take into account the extensions of the scope in phase 2, provided that Member States substantiate and verify their emissions accruing from these extensions. Secondly, adjustment will be made with respect to further extensions of the scope of the ETS in the third trading period. Thirdly, any opt-out of small installations will lead to a corresponding reduction of the cap. Fourthly, the figures do not take account of the inclusion of aviation, nor of emissions from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.


Will allowances still be allocated for free?


نعم فعلا. Industrial installations will receive transitional free allocation. And in those Member States that are eligible for the optional derogation, power plants may, if the Member State so decides, also receive free allowances. It is estimated that at least half of the available allowances as of 2018 will be auctioned.


While the great majority of allowances has been allocated free of charge to installations in the first and second trading periods, the Commission proposed that auctioning of allowances should become the basic principle for allocation. This is because auctioning best ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the system and creates the greatest incentive for investments in a low-carbon economy. It best complies with the “polluter pays principle” and avoids giving windfall profits to certain sectors that have passed on the notional cost of allowances to their customers despite receiving them for free.


How will allowances be handed out for free?


By 31 December 2018, the Commission will adopt EU-wide rules, which will be developed under a committee procedure (“Comitology”). These rules will fully harmonise allocations and thus all firms across the EU with the same or similar activities will be subject to the same rules. The rules will ensure as far as possible that the allocation promotes carbon-efficient technologies. The adopted rules provide that to the extent feasible, allocations are to be based on so-called benchmarks, e. g. a number of allowances per quantity of historical output. Such rules reward operators that have taken early action to reduce greenhouse gases, better reflect the polluter pays principle and give stronger incentives to reduce emissions, as allocations would no longer depend on historical emissions. All allocations are to be determined before the start of the third trading period and no ex-post adjustments will be allowed.


Which installations will receive free allocations and which will not? How will negative impacts on competitiveness be avoided?


Taking into account their ability to pass on the increased cost of emission allowances, full auctioning is the rule from 2018 onwards for electricity generators. However, Member States who fulfil certain conditions relating to their interconnectivity or their share of fossil fuels in electricity production and GDP per capita in relation to the EU-27 average, have the option to temporarily deviate from this rule with respect to existing power plants. The auctioning rate in 2018 is to be at least 30% in relation to emissions in the first period and has to increase progressively to 100% no later than 2020. If the option is applied, the Member State has to undertake to invest in improving and upgrading of the infrastructure, in clean technologies and in diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply for an amount to the extent possible equal to the market value of the free allocation.


In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2018, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2018, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.


CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.


Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2018, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.


Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?


Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.


Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2018, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.


How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?


All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.


Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2018?


The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.


As from 2018, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.


As of 2018, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.


Will small installations be excluded from the scope?


A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2018, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.


How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?


For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2018, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2018 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2018-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.


These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).


On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2018 will be accepted in the period 2018-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2018 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.


To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2018 onwards in Least Developed Countries.


Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2018 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.


Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?


No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:


LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.


The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.


Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?


نعم فعلا. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.


Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?


A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.


A new provision will apply as of 2018 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.


The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.


Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?


نعم فعلا. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.


The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.


While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.


What is a Community registry and how does it work?


Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2018 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.


Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?


The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2018 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.


What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?


Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2018 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.


A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.


In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.


What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?


The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.


A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2018 for this purpose.


What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?


When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.


For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.


ما هي الخطوات التالية؟


Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2018, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2018.


The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2018), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2018) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2018).


International carbon market.


International carbon markets can play a key role in reducing global greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively.


The number of emissions trading systems around the world is increasing. Besides the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS), national or sub-national systems are already operating or under development in Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States.


Carbon markets in Paris Agreement.


The Paris Agreement provides for a robust and ambitious basis for the use of international markets and reinforces international targets, transparency and the accountability of Parties.


Recognising the importance of international carbon markets, Article 6 of the agreement.


allows Parties to use international trading of emission allowances to help achieve emissions reduction targets establishes a framework for common robust accounting rules , and.


creates a new, more ambitious market mechanism .


Bilateral cooperation.


In 2018, a 3-year project was initiated by the European Commission in close cooperation with China to support the design and the implementation of emission trading in China.


The project provides technical assistance for capacity building. It supports the 7 regional pilot systems already set up and the establishment of a nation-wide emission trading system.


In the EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change adopted at the EU-China Summit on 29 June 2018, the EU and China agreed to "further enhance existing bilateral cooperation on carbon markets, building upon and expanding on the on-going EU-China emission trading capacity building project and work together in the years ahead on the issues related to carbon emissions trading."


Against this background, the Commission and China are considering further activities.


The Korean emissions trading system (KETS), launched in 2018, covers around 66% of Korea's total greenhouse gas emissions. It is the first mandatory emissions trading system among non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC.


The KETS could trigger the expansion of emissions trading among emerging economies and developing countries.


The European Commission supports Korea through a technical assistance project focused on building the necessary capacity to implement the KETS.


Multilateral cooperation.


The European Commission is a founding member of the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), which brings together countries and regions with mandatory cap-and-trade systems. The ICAP provides a forum for sharing experience and knowledge and organises regular training courses.


The Commission also supports the development of domestic carbon markets through the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR). The PMR is a platform for the exchange of experience on carbon market instruments and assists some 17 countries in preparing and implementing these.


Linking with other cap-and-trade systems.


Linking compatible emissions trading systems with each other enables participants in one system to use units from another system for compliance purposes.


Linking offers several potential benefits , including:


reducing the cost of cutting emissions increasing market liquidity making the carbon price more stable levelling the international playing field by harmonising carbon prices across jurisdictions, and supporting global cooperation on climate change.


The EU ETS legislation provides for the possibility to link the EU ETS with other compatible emissions trading systems in the world at national or regional level.


Conditions for linking include:


system compatibility (the systems have the same basic environmental integrity, and a tonne of CO 2 in one system is a tonne in the other system) the mandatory nature of the system, and the existence of an absolute cap on emissions.


The EU and Switzerland have signed an agreement to link their systems. Once the agreement has entered into force, linking would result in the mutual recognition of EU and Swiss emission allowances. Switzerland would keep a separate system from the EU ETS.


The EU and Australia also considered the possibility to link their systems. However, due to the repeal of the Australian system in 2018, the linking negotiations have not been pursued.


Eligibility of international credits.


08/11/2018 - Commission Regulation (EU) No 1123/2018 on determining international credit entitlements 07/06/2018 - Commission Regulation (EU) No 550/2018 determining certain restrictions applicable to the use of international credits from projects involving industrial gases Positive and negative credit lists General positive list General negative list Explanatory note on the credit lists Harmonised rules regarding large hydroelectric dam projects: 27/10/2004 - Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms Guidelines on the application of Article 11(b) 6 of Directive 2004/101/EC Project compliance questionnaire.


Linking with other greenhouse gas emissions trading systems.


Encouraging new market mechanisms.


31/08/2018 - Study: Design options for sectoral carbon market mechanisms EU submissions on the new market mechanism 11/04/2018 - Views on the new market based mechanism 13/08/2018 - Addendum 26/05/2018 - COM(2018) 265 - Communication: Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage 09/03/2018 - COM(2018) 86 - Communication: International climate policy post-Copenhagen Studies.


Open all questions.


الأسئلة & أمب؛ answers on implementation of rules regarding the eligibility of international credits in the EU ETS (10/2018)


When did the new Registry Regulation (Regulation No 389/2018) enter into force?


Regulation No. 389/2018 entered into force on 4 May 2018.


What does 'legally binding' quantified emission targets from 2018 to 2020 mean in the context of Article 58(2) of the new Registry Regulation?


The term 'legally binding' refers to the entry into force of the amendment to the Kyoto Protocol under international law (i. e. once three quarters of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have deposited instruments of ratification).


What is the impact of Article 58(2) on projects from Annex B Parties in third countries (i. e. non-EU ETS Parties)?


In accordance with Article 58(2) of the new Registry Regulation, ERUs issued after 31 December 2018 in respect of emission reductions taking place until 31 December 2018 from non-EU ETS Annex B Parties can only be held in ETS accounts in the Union Registry provided that:


The amendment to the Kyoto Protocol including a commitment for such a Party has entered into force OR The Party has deposited an instrument of ratification OR The credits are issued under track 2 OR Where track 2 issuance is not possible, the date of reduction (pre-2018) is certified by an AIE.


What other credits cannot be held in ETS accounts in the Union Registry?


Unit holdings in ETS accounts in the Union Registry are harmonised in accordance with Annex I of the Registry Regulation. It should be noted that for person holding accounts in Member States' Kyoto Protocol Registries, Member States can determine unit holdings. Person holding accounts in Member States' Kyoto Protocol Registries can be identified by their 121 account type (e. g. PT-121-1234567 for a person holding account in the Portuguese part of the Union Registry).


If a credit cannot be held in an ETS account in the Union Registry in accordance with Annex I, where can it be held in the Registry System?


These credits can be held in Member States' Kyoto Protocol Registries part of the Union Registry, in person holding accounts if allowed by the Member State.


How can the user know if a credit is eligible for exchange and holding in an ETS account, since serial numbers are not visible in the Union Registry?


The Registry application itself will flag international credits as eligible or ineligible . This status will be clearly visible in the application. On this basis, an account holder will be able to distinguish eligible credits held on a KP account from those that are either pending eligibility (because further steps are required) or ineligible (in accordance with relevant legislation).


Is there a cut-off date for the use of international credits issued for the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period (CP1 credits) ?


Yes, in Accordance with Article 60 of the Registry Regulation, credits issued in respect of emission reductions occurring in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol can be exchanged until 31 March 2018. These credits cannot be exchanged after this date, even if they are "carried-over" or banked into the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. After 31 March 2018, these credits will be marked as "ineligible" in the Union Registry.


How can holders of international credits identify whether their credits need to be exchanged before 31 March 2018 in accordance with Article 60 of the Registry Regulation?


The serial number of each credit contains both the original commitment period (the commitment period for which the unit was issued) and the applicable commitment period (the period in which the unit can be retired). The original commitment period is visible in the Union Registry. After 31 March 2018, those international credits with an original commitment period of 1 (i. e. those units issued for CP1 reductions) will no longer be eligible for exchange. That is, after 31 March 2018, these credits will be marked as "ineligible" in the Union Registry.


It is important to note, that even if these credits are "carried-over" or banked between commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol, the original commitment period will remain unchanged and these credits will continue to be ineligible for exchange in the EU ETS.


What if international credits for which ETS holdings are prohibited according to Annex I are held in ETS accounts in the Union Registry after entry into force of the Registry Regulation or after 31 March 2018 (for CP1 credits)?


International credits issued after the respective deadlines set out in Article 58 and Article 60 of the Registry Regulation have become ineligible following the entry into force of the Regulation or, for CP1 units, after 31 March 2018.


In accordance with Article 58(3), and Article 115, the so-called "cleaning" operation, the National Administrators have requested the account holders of these credits to transfer them to an appropriate Kyoto Protocol account.


A similar operation will be undertaken after 31 March 2018 to implement Article 60 of the Registry Regulation in respect of CP1 credits.


When does the exchange of international credits for allowances take place?


The exchange can take place at any point during the calendar year.


The international credit entitlement tables contain entitlements calculated for each installation and aircraft operator by Member States in accordance with the Regulation on international credit entitlements (RICE).


How will the exchange work?


The process for the exchange is described in detail in the Registry Regulation (Articles 59-61). An account representative can request an exchange of eligible international credits from an operator holding account or an aircraft operator holding account in the Union registry. The exchange request needs to be approved by a second person nominated as additional account representative or, if no additional account representative is nominated for the account, by a second account representative different than the one who initiated the request. The exchange process is automated: after the international credits are transferred to a central account, an equivalent number of allowances will be transferred automatically to the account from which the exchange was requested.


An operator can request as many exchanges of credits for allowances as needed, provided it does not exceed its international credit entitlement. Once credits are exchanged for allowances, they cannot be exchanged back into credits.


Is the status of the credit as marked in the registry (e. g. eligible or ineligible ) fixed or subject to change?


The information in the Union Registry regarding the eligibility of international credits is subject to change over time based on the best information available.


If the credit is a CER, it will be important to check the effective registration date of the project. If the host Party is not an LDC and the effective registration date is after 2018, CERs from the project will not be eligible for exchange in the EU ETS in accordance with the provisions of Article 11a(8) of the EU ETS Directive.


If the credit is a CER and the effective registration date is before 2018 , it is also important to check that it is not ineligible in phase 3 of the EU ETS in accordance with Regulation 550/2018 (e. g. it is not an HFC-23 project nor an N2O-adipic acid project).


If the credit is a track 1 ERU issued by a non-EU Party before 2018 , the information in the Union Registry is, to our knowledge, accurate with respect to the provisions in the EU ETS Directive and the Registry Regulation.


Likewise, for CERs, track 2 ERUs and ERUs issued by an EU Member State the information in the Union Registry is, to our knowledge, accurate with respect to the provisions in the EU ETS Directive and the Registry Regulation.


A credit in my account is marked as ineligible but, it should be eligible International Credit Holdings (ICH). How should I proceed?


In the first instance, check the eligibility lists published on our website.


If the credit has been incorrectly marked based on the published criteria, please contact your National Administrator.


If the ERU was issued after 31 December 2018 , the status of the credit will be updated upon successful completion of the certification referred to in Q16.


In all cases, if a change of status is warranted, the status of a credit will be changed the day after the information is updated in the Union Registry.


If my credit is marked as pending/ineligible , what is the impact?


The immediate impact is that such credits cannot be transferred to another ETS account in the Union Registry. These credits can, however, be transferred to a KP account.


After a "cleaning" operation referred to in Article 58 (3) (see Q9) has been completed, it will no longer be possible to hold credits marked as ineligible in EU ETS accounts and these credits will need to be moved accordingly.


When will the ineligible credits need to be moved out of ETS accounts in the Union Registry (in accordance with Article 58(3))?


An initial operation has already taken place and your national administrator should have already contacted account representatives. A further "cleaning" operation will take place to manage units issued in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This operation is foreseen after the deadline for the exchange of the credits, 31 March 2018, in accordance with Article 60 of the Regulation 389/2018.


When will market participants be informed about the certification required under Article 58(2)?


Guidance on the certification which applies in accordance with Article 58(2) of the Registry Regulation is available.


الأسئلة & أمب؛ answers on use of international credits in the third trading phase of the EU ETS (January 2018)


المصطلح.


Least Developed Countries (LDCs) list: As there had been no international agreement at the end of 2018, nor had there been any EU agreements with third countries, article 11a(4-5) provides a default situation of prohibition on using new-project CERs beyond 2018, unless they are from LDCs or can be swapped for CERs from LDCs. What happens if a country loses its LDC status: if the project is at validation stage, if the project is registered, if CERs have already been issued?


The guidance on the DG CLIMA webpage explains that "A project in an LDC that is included in the UN list when the project is registered by the CDM Executive Board may continue to generate credits up to 2020, whatever happens to the list.


Crediting period renewal: Does the registration date pertaining to 'projects that were registered before 2018' referred to in Article 11a(2-4) correspond to the start date of the first crediting period of the project, or to the start date of any subsequent crediting period?


The start date refers to the start date of the first crediting period. Hence credits from projects that were registered prior to 2018 and that have their crediting period renewed after 2018 will continue to be usable (in the absence of use restrictions).


Date of registration: What will be the applicable cut-off date for the registration of CDM projects for being able to produce EU-ETS-eligible CERs post 2018.


Subject to no other quality restrictions, credits from projects registered before 2018 will be eligible for use in the EU ETS. The date of registration shall be the registration date determined by the EB, including the effective date of registration in accordance with Decision 3/CMP.6 i. e. "the date on which a complete request for registration has been submitted by the designated operational entity where the project activity has been registered automatically".


Implementation of provisions.


Swapping process: As from 2018, recognised international credits must be exchanged into (phase 3) allowances before surrendering them for compliance.


a) What are the modalities for this swapping process? Who will do it, when will it start?


The exchange of credits will start from 1 January 2018 onwards or as soon as a forthcoming revision of the Registry Regulation has been adopted, whatever is latest. The modalities will be developed in this revision. Only "operators" as defined in the ETS Directive can exchange CERs/ERUs for allowances.


b) Will this be an instant process or would there be a delay in receiving an allowance in return for a CER on the same user account?


Details in this regard will be determined in a forthcoming amendment of the registry regulation.


c) Can a request for a swap be refused on grounds other than the credit not being a compliance credit and if yes under which circumstances?


Details in this regard will be determined in a forthcoming amendment of the Registry Regulation. Given that the exchange route is only for operators, an exchange will be declined if an operator has exhausted the limit of its entitlements for exchanging credits, as reflected in articles 11.a(2-4) and (8) of the ETS Directive.


d) Can swapping be done at any time during the year, or do operators have to wait until the surrender deadline?


Details in this regard will be determined in a forthcoming amendment of the Registry Regulation. The Commission envisages for the exchange to take place throughout the calendar year and not limited to the annual compliance date. The competent authority will make the exchange on request from operators.


Quantitative limits: Article 11a(8) provides for options whereby operators would be able to use additional volumes of credits beyond the quantity they were allowed to use between 2008 and 2018. What are the steps and timeline of the comitology process to 'specify the exact percentages' of additional allowed credit volumes?


The ETS Directive does not specify the time by which these volumes should be determined. The Commission foresees that the necessary rules should be in place before credits are used in respect of phase 3.


UNFCCC carry-over rules: The Marrakesh rules (Decision 13/CMP.1) state that Parties are allowed to carry over CERs and ERUs 2.5% of their initial Kyoto AAUs to the potential subsequent commitment period. This amount will be confirmed after the true up period in 2018.


a) Can a compliance company, or a non-compliance actor carry over international credits "as credits" to the post-2018 period? In other words, will it be possible to bank CERs/ERUs?


For phase 3, credits can only be used for compliance in the EU ETS if exchanged for phase 3 allowances. This exchange of international credits with a first commitment period identifier into allowances will only be allowed until March 2018, which is before the end of the Kyoto Protocol's true-up period. On the difficulties of banking under the Kyoto protocol of selective CDM CP1 into the future, see chapter 6.2.4. 'Transition and predictability' of the 2008 impact assessment accompanying the revision of the EU ETS.


b) Are all EU ETS account holders able to carry over credits within limits?


Under the EU ETS, all compliance buyers (i. e. not all account holders) can exchange unused credits within the limits provided in article 11a and this exchange is guaranteed until the end of March 2018.


Future policy development.


Bilateral agreements:


a) Given the continuing absence of an international agreement, what action has the Commission taken to negotiate bilateral agreements with major host countries?


The Commission envisages the primary focus of potential bilateral agreements to be on creating demand for credits from new market mechanisms and to pilot the establishment of such new market mechanisms. The Commission contributes and actively participates in the World Bank's Programme for Market Readiness to promote such initiatives.


b) Bilateral agreements: How can interested stakeholders contribute to the set-up and implementation of bilateral agreements?


Stakeholders are encouraged to reach out to developing countries to support and explain the EU's position on the future of the carbon market, share lessons learned from emissions trading, Joint Implementation, Activities Implemented Jointly, and the CDM and explore areas for testing new market mechanisms.


c) Bilateral agreements: Will bilateral agreements be broad in nature (e. g. for all sectors in the host country) or targeted to specific sectors?


EU legislation is very open with regard to the scope of bilateral agreements that might be reached.


Process for qualitative restrictions: From 1 January 2018, measures may be applied to restrict 'the use of specific credits from project types' according to article 11a(9).


a) What is the definition of 'type'? What is the definition of 'specific credits'?


Under 'type' the Commission understands credits that were generated using one or several methodologies approved by the UNFCCC CDM Executive Board and JI Supervisory Committee. 'Specific credits' could refer to all credits under a project type or credits from a project type generated in a set of countries.


b) Have any such qualitative restrictions been adopted so far?


From the start of the EU ETS in 2005 full use restrictions have already been applied in the EU ETS to CERs from projects at nuclear facilities and from projects in agriculture and forestry (so-called LULUCF). As of 1 January 2018 CERs and ERUs from projects involving the destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from adipic acid production will be prohibited in the EU ETS. An exception is made until 30 April 2018 for destruction from existing projects that is credited before 1 January 2018, for compliance with 2018 commitments.


c) Are there further proposals under consideration to apply qualitative restrictions to any specific project type?


The revised ETS Directive provides for use restrictions to be introduced as part of the implementing provisions for credits which are otherwise usable during phase 3 of the EU ETS, running from 2018 to 2020. While the legislation allows putting in place further use restrictions adding to those adopted in early 2018, the European Commission is currently not considering any additional use restrictions.


d) How will qualitative restrictions be tracked and controlled?


Qualitative restrictions will be tracked and controlled through the introduction of automatic checks in the Union registry, based on the information regarding the project ID and the commitment period identifier of relevant international credits.


e) Is a positive list of unrestricted credits possible?


EU legislation does not foresee such a list.


f) Type of qualitative restrictions: What type of restrictions could be invoked according to article 11a(9)?


The Directive does not limit the types of restrictions that can be introduced. These will depend on project-type, economic, environmental, strategic and administrative circumstances.


Programme of Activities (PoAs): According to Article 11a(2) credits from projects registered pre-2018 are eligible for compliance in the EU ETS.


a) Does this imply that CDM Project Activities (CPAs) included after 2018 to PoAs registered pre-2018 are also eligible?


Article 11.a(3) of the EU ETS Directive states that "…competent authorities shall allow operators to exchange CERs and ERUs from projects that were registered before 2018 issued in respect of emission reductions from 2018 onwards for allowances valid from 2018 onwards". This wording would indicate that the moment of registration of a project is to be taken as a cut-off date for determining whether future CERs would be eligible for use in the EU ETS. A PoA is only registered once and CPAs are added to a PoA without a separate registration. It is therefore the Commission's interpretation that CERs from CPAs added after 2018 to a PoA registered prior to 2018 can be used for compliance in the EU ETS.


The Commission is, however, also aware that this interpretation of article 11.a(3) may increase the supply of CERs from non-LDCs. This contradicts the spirit of the Directive to allow only CERs from projects registered after 2018, if they come from LDCs. The Commission will therefore continue to monitor the evolution of PoAs, including their impact on the development of new sectoral mechanisms. The Commission notes that the Directive allows the Commission to propose appropriate regulatory measures under article 11.a(9) of the EU ETS, if the situation would require this.


b) Would restrictions (if adopted according to article 11a(9)) be applicable to PoAs?


Any use restrictions for specific credits from project-types agreed under article 11.a(9) would also be applicable to PoAs.


c) Will CERs from CPAs in LDCs be EU ETS eligible, if the PoA (no matter date of registration) also includes non-LDCs (so called cross country PoAs)?


This will depend on the possibility to clearly distinguish the country of origin of each CER, and whether such a filter can easily be introduced in the CITL. If this is the case, the Commission sees no objections to this.


JI projects registered before 2018: Article 11a(3) allows exchange of credits from projects registered before 2018 issued in respect of emission reductions from 2018 onwards. This applies both to CERs and ERUs. However, in the case of ERUs, issuance and transfer by the Host Party is subject to prior conversion of AAUs. This means that the absence of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol would imply no continuation of JI projects after 2018. Has it been considered how to implement Article 11a(3) with regard to ERUs, in the absence of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol: Continuation of JI project baselines beyond 2018 via a bilateral agreement – would this be a bilateral agreement signed between the EU as a block and various host countries to allow continuation of projects within that country?


a) Continuation of JI project baselines beyond 2018 via a bilateral agreement – would this be a bilateral agreement signed between the EU as a block and various host countries to allow continuation of projects within that country?


As explained in relation to question 6, bilateral agreements are envisaged to focus on the promotion of sectoral market mechanisms.


b) In the event that projects fall outside the EU ETS: Can such projects use commitment period 1 (CP1) AAUs to back ERUs generated January 2018 – March 2018?


The Commission considers that this is not in line with the Kyoto Protocol, according to which AAUs have been created in respect of emissions from 2008 to 2018 (CP1). In line with the principle of the Kyoto Protocol, the continuation of JI after 2018 is subject to new quantified emission targets being in place (CP2). This is also referred to in the recitals of the EU legislation (recital 28 of Directive 2009/29/EC). Using CP1 AAUs for backing ERUs generated between January 2018 and March 2018 is opposed to this, as it would allow the conversion of CP1 AAUs (not usable in the EU ETS) into a CP1 ERUs on behalf of post 2018 reductions (usable in the EU ETS). This would mix up the accounting system under which these units are created. Also, the UNFCCC Secretariat's advice on CDM accounting goes in the opposite direction, thereby creating an inconsistency that should not be supported. The CDM Executive Board have advised that "CERs may be used by Annex I Parties in complying with their emission targets for the first commitment period, as long as they have been issued for emission reductions or removals taking place up to the end of 2018". If nothing else, the continuation of crediting CDM projects is less of an issue as these projects do not impact on the inventories of Annex I Parties.


Sectoral crediting / trading: The EU intends to develop new mechanisms to scale up the use of carbon markets for climate finance and to provide better incentives for own mitigation action in developing countries.


a) Has the Commission assessed the actual possibility of sectoral mechanisms to meet demand for international credits in the EU ETS in the near future?


Under existing commitments there is currently no shortage of supply to accommodate the maximum possible EU demand for international credits. In fact, one of the main challenges for the introduction of sectoral mechanisms is to ensure sufficient demand for such credits. The speed by which new mechanisms can be implemented will also depend on other factors, including progress made in the international negotiation on their establishment, the geographical and sectoral scope of the first application, and the level of interest from developing countries.


b) How does the Commission intend to address possible disruptions in the market (due to the combined effect of possible CDM restrictions and new crediting mechanisms)?


The Commission does not share the view that the market would be disrupted by a (temporary) shortage of supply of international credits. The flexible nature of the EU ETS design would simply result in the allowance price incentivising more reductions in installations covered by the EU ETS and a reduced reliance on international credits for compliance purposes.


c) Does the Commission have plans to consult with stakeholders on the practical implementation of sectoral crediting?


No specific stakeholder consultation is planned on this issue, as the Commission regularly interacts with interested stakeholders and always welcomes ideas and input from stakeholders on practical implementation of sectoral crediting.


d) How could the private sector get involved with sectoral crediting?


Implementation of sectoral crediting will require a considerably more important role of the host country governments. They offer host governments to implement sectoral policies that achieve structural transformations of targeted sectors. The role of the private sector, in particular current project developers and consultants, is likely to change significantly. Instead of directly receiving credits from an international body as it is the case with CDM, project developers will need to interact with national governments. This provides for a more proactive role of national governments to introduce appropriate regulatory frameworks for blending of public and private sources of finance. The incentives for the private sector to invest in GHG emissions reductions will depend on the chosen policy mix, and will be country-specific. The proactive interaction between developing country host governments and the private sector on how to best put an incentive structure in place to attract private capital should be encouraged.


e) Could the emerging international REDD+ mechanism qualify as a sectoral mechanism?


No, for reasons of liability, non-permanence and capacity to monitor emissions with sufficient level of accuracy credits from a possible REDD+ mechanism will not be considered for compliance use in the EU ETS before the end of phase 3.


Stepping up the EU reduction target: The CDM pipeline would imply that CERs from projects registered pre-2018 could be sufficient to cover the demand from the current CER/ERU import limits in phases two and three.


a) Could potential rules on credit eligibility (except where bilateral agreements) be relaxed in a move beyond the current 20% reduction target?


The impact assessment accompanying the introduction of use restrictions on industrial gas credits in the EU ETS has identified significant economic and environmental shortcomings of such credits. These would not disappear with more stringent EU targets. Therefore there are no reasons to reconsider the ban on such credits. But more generally, under a stricter cap strategic decisions will have to be made whether to allow for more credits, and if so which types of credits this would be (new market mechanisms, CDM, etc.).


b) In case of a 30% reduction target with increased access to credits, what would be the share of use of these credits between ETS and non ETS sectors.


This would have to be determined through an appropriate impact assessment, if and when such an increased target is politically decided.


Is the adoption of a 2nd commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol an " international agreement on climate change" in the sense of Art. 11a(7) of the EU ETS Directive and Art. 5(3) of the Effort Sharing Decision?


The ETS Directive (Directive 2009/29) and the Effort Sharing Decision (Decision 406/2009) make clear that the term "international agreement on climate change" refers to the "future" agreement that was expected to be reached at COP15 in Copenhagen and that would apply for the period "beyond 2018". This, however, did not happen in Copenhagen.


Negotiations have continued ever since, resulting in the decision in Durban in December 2018 to "launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties", to be adopted by 2018 and to come into effect and be implemented from 2020.


The adoption of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol without a legally binding agreement for the period beyond 2018 under which other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries commit themselves to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and capabilities is therefore not an international agreement as referred to in Article 11a(7) of the EU ETS Directive and Article 5(3)of the Effort Sharing Decision.


Would reaching an international agreement pursuant to Article 11a(7) of the EU ETS Directive and Article 5(3) of the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) reopen the EU ETS and ESD to CDM credits from projects registered post-2018 other than in Least Developed Countries (LDCs)? What would an agreement mean for eligibility of credits from LDCs?


Articles 11a(7) of the EU ETS Directive and Article 5(3) of the ESD limit the acceptance of CDM credits to those from countries that have ratified the new "international agreement on climate change". They do not "broaden" access in any way.


Thus, once an international agreement pursuant to Article 11a(7) of the EU ETS Directive and Article 5(3) of the ESD is reached, the limitation to CDM credits from new projects from the LDCs for the period starting in 2018 continues to apply. Any broadening of the eligibility criteria to allow new credits from other countries, with the exception of credits used under Article 11a(5), would require an amendment of the ETS Directive. Credits from projects in LDCs and other countries started before 2018 will only be accepted if they originate from countries that have ratified the agreement.


How many international credits will be allowed in the EU ETS after 2020?


The magnitude and nature of international credits for which a demand may be created in the EU ETS from 2021 onwards is yet to be defined. The European Parliament and Council would, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, decide how much demand the EU should create for international credits and of what types at a later stage and in the light of various factors, including the level of ambition of countries in the post-2020 climate regime.


الأسئلة & أمب؛ answers on use restrictions for certain industrial gas credits as of 2018 (November 2018)


What types of credits are restricted, what kind of restriction will apply and when will the use restrictions enter into force?


The use of international credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) from projects involving the destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O) from adipic acid production in the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) will be prohibited as of 1 January 2018. An exception is made until 30 April 2018 for projects taking place before 1 January 2018, complying with 2018 commitments.


Are these the first use restrictions applied in the EU ETS?


No. Full use restrictions have already been applied in the EU ETS to credits generated from projects at nuclear facilities and from credits generated from agriculture and forestry (so-called LULUCF) activities.


Why were use restrictions focused on industrial gas credits?


There are a number of reasons for adopting use restrictions on some industrial gas projects. The acceptance of credits from industrial gas projects has been controversial for some time. Certain gases have a very high global warming potential and abatement is very cheap. This can create huge financial rewards for project developers. The main concerns about these projects are:


a) Additionality – is production and subsequent destruction of the gas higher than what would have happened without a CDM project?


HFC-23 is produced as a by-product during production of another greenhouse gas, HCFC-22, principally in air conditioners and refrigerators. HFC-22 is a powerful ozone depleting substance, which is covered by the Montreal Protocol. Crediting the abatement of HFC-23 can create a perverse incentive to produce more HCFC-22 than would have happened without the CDM, and consequently produce credits that are not additional.


Also, the EU considers that cheap emission reductions in developing countries, such as those from certain industrial gas projects, should not be realised through the carbon market, but instead should be the responsibility of developing countries as part of their own efforts. Alternatively, these reductions could still be in part or fully funded by developed countries based on the actual costs for their abatement.


b) Obstacles to development of sectoral crediting mechanisms.


Due to the big quantity of cheap credits available from HFC-23 and N2O from adipic acid production, there is insufficient demand for credits from sectoral mechanisms. The EU favours these mechanisms above HFC-23 and N2O projects, because they stimulate domestic climate policy action in developing countries across broad segments of the economy, generate higher volume of credits at lower transaction costs, facilitate a move to multi-sectoral cap-and-trade system, and scale up additional international carbon finance flows to Developing countries.


c) Obstacles to phase out of gases under the Montreal Protocol.


The current incentive structures for HFC-23 undermine attempts under the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the phase-out of HCFC-22 for non-feedstock use, and to consider financing the destruction of HFC-23 on an via contributions to the Multilateral Fund.


d) Imbalance in the geographical distribution of projects.


The dominance of industrial gas projects distorts the geographical distribution of projects under the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms in favour of some advanced developing economies. The EU has called for a better geographical distribution of projects in the CDM, in particular for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Use restrictions can encourage investment in projects in LDCs.


How could stakeholders contribute?


During the preparations of the Commission proposal and accompanying impact assessment, stakeholders were invited to submit their views on the design of use restrictions for industrial gas credits. Many stakeholders responded and provided valuable written input.


How can use restrictions improve value for money?


Revenues from the sale of HFC-23 credits in the EU ETS represent up to 78 times the initial capital investment and operational costs of these projects. In other words, the rates of return of these projects are excessive. These projects are not reducing global emissions in an efficient manner. The EU considers that cheap emission reductions, such as those from industrial gas projects, should not be done through the carbon market, but instead should be the responsibility of developing countries as part of their appropriate own action to keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius.


Which countries are the main suppliers of industrial gas credits?


80% of HFC-23 credits and 60% of N2O credits under the CDM come from China. The remainder of these projects are mostly generated in India and some advanced developing countries (some of them OECD-members). Use restrictions are therefore fully in line with an increasing focus of the CDM on LDCs. The EU considers that OECD countries, such as South Korea and Mexico, should contribute to mitigation through measures such as sectoral market mechanisms or emissions trading, rather than through CDM projects.


Are the use restrictions "retroactive"?


No. The EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC) allows for restricting the use in the EU ETS of credits from certain project types. This by no means affects the issuance of units, which is managed by the CDM Executive Board. The Directive foresees a notice period of 6 months to 3 years for the application of restrictions from the time they are formally adopted in order to allow sufficient time for market participants to adapt.


What will be the market impacts of these use restrictions?


The EU considers there will be enough credits available from the 3300 other projects (non HFC-23, non-adipic acid N2O) registered so far to supply the EU ETS up to the limit allowed over the next 10 years, even without any new credits from sectoral crediting. Therefore allowance prices should be relatively unaffected.


The market was given early notice of the use restrictions, so as to enhance investment in alternative projects that can deliver credits for the EU ETS from 2018 to 2020. The impact assessment shows that even if developed and developing countries fully implement their pledges under the Copenhagen Accord; there would still be sufficient reduction potential in developing countries in areas other than industrial gases at prices below the current European carbon price. This is confirmed by e. g., a recent study by Bloomberg New Energy Finance [1] .


Are HFC-23 projects not crucial to create sufficient liquidity in the carbon market?


Overall liquidity is guaranteed by the fungibility between CERs/ERUs and EU allowances. The economic recession has produced a situation where many EU companies accumulate and hold sizeable surpluses of allowances. In the light of this, there will be sufficient liquidity in the market for the coming years.


Will the restrictions lead to a fragmentation of the international carbon market?


No, because the EU makes up the vast majority of the international carbon market. In addition, other (developed) countries are likely to follow the EU's lead in not accepting industrial gas credits,.


Is this not a matter for the UNFCCC?


As the largest purchaser of JI and CDM credits in the world, and to safeguard the integrity of its Emissions Trading System, the EU takes the lead in the UNFCCC process in trying to reform the CDM in order to improve its environmental integrity, effectiveness, efficiency, regional distribution and contribution to sustainable development. The EU will continue to work in the UNFCCC process towards this end. Nonetheless, it is for the EU to ensure the integrity of the EU Emission Trading System and to decide which international credits it allows for compliance, in accordance with the EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC).


The restrictions proposed would not replace the function of the CDM Executive Board or the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee. The restrictions apply only to the use of these units for compliance purposes in the EU ETS.


Isn't the CDM Executive Board also investigating HFC-23 credits?


The Board is assessing allegations of non-additionality of HFC-23 credits. We strongly support action of the CDM Executive Board to eliminate these allegations, but this is not the only reason for restrictions in the EU ETS. There are other concerns related to the environmental merits, cost-effectiveness and competitive distortions of these projects. The EU must also reconcile the domestic use of CDM credits and its demands internationally to move away from the CDM towards sectoral mechanisms. Finally, the same concerns apply to JI projects of these categories.


Will the European Commission propose to apply further use restrictions beyond industrial gases for phase 3?


The ban on credits from these industrial gases is one of the implementing provisions of the revised ETS Directive for the third phase of the EU ETS, from 2018 to 2020. There may be further use restrictions in the future. However, the European Commission is currently not considering any specific use restrictions beyond industrial gases.


What is the "major overhaul" of the CDM that the EU is envisaging?


The European Union advocates creating a new generation of sectoral market mechanisms in more advanced developing countries, as a first step towards cap-and-trade systems. In addition, the environmental integrity of the CDM should be improved and the system should focus on Least Developed Countries. The CDM is a pure offsetting mechanism, where a tonne of greenhouse gas emissions reduced in a developing country creates a right to emit a tonne of greenhouse gases in a developed country. The EU believes that such a system cannot deliver the emission reductions needed to keep global warming below 2°C. To achieve this goal, commitments by industrialised countries should be complemented by appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries, in particular the most advanced developing countries.


Do these restrictions bind also Member States when they buy international credits for compliance with non-ETS emissions?


No. Use restrictions applied in accordance with the revised EU ETS Directive are only applicable to companies covered by the EU ETS. However, if Member States intend to use credits which are restricted in the EU ETS, for compliance with their 2018-2020 targets outside the EU ETS, they will have to motivate this to the European Commission. Several Member States have already decided not to use such credits for non-ETS compliance.


EU Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme In Freefall.


The European Union carbon emissions trading scheme­—the biggest in the world and the heart of Europe’s climate-change program—is in dire straits. The scheme’s carbon price has collapsed. The primary reason: The economic recession has suppressed manufacturing, thereby reducing emissions and creating a huge oversupply of carbon emissions allowances.


Carbon trading is a market approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in which each facility involved is given an emissions cap for the year, and each year that cap is reduced. A firm must record and report its facilities’ emissions and must obtain allowances for its total emissions. An allowance permits a facility to emit 1 metric ton of carbon dioxide or its carbon equivalent; some allowances are given for free by the government, others can be bought at auction or from other firms.


If a facility exceeds its cap, the company operating it has options: It can reduce emissions, buy allowances from other companies, or obtain allowance offsets by reducing emissions at another pollution source. The cost of an allowance is referred to as the carbon price and is driven by market conditions such as supply and demand.


If the low carbon price continues, the region’s ability to meet long-term reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions will be severely hampered because the trading scheme will fail to provide money for cleantech programs and incentive for manufacturers to adopt cleaner technologies.


The trading scheme is a key component of the EU’s climate-change strategy because about 40% of all greenhouse gases emitted in the region fall under EU’s control. The mandatory scheme applies to 11,000 industrial installations, including power plants and major chemical facilities, across all 27 member states, as well as in Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. The aviation sector has been included in the scheme, but its active participation has been deferred to allow for an international agreement on aviation emissions, which is expected to be concluded in the fall.


The goal of the European Commission, the EU’s administrative body and the architect of the emissions trading scheme, is to reduce all greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 1990 levels by 2020. To contribute toward this goal, the trading scheme has targeted a 21% cut in the emissions of participating sectors by 2020 from a 2005 baseline.


In recent weeks, however, the EU carbon price dropped to a new low of $5.20 for each metric ton allowance of CO 2 , down from a high of $23 in 2018. This is despite an annual reduction of the EU emissions cap of 1.74% through 2020 and the introduction on Jan. 1 of a new phase of the scheme requiring companies to purchase allowances.


At its current carbon price, the EU emission scheme’s role in encouraging chemical firms to ditch fossil fuels and adopt greener technologies “is meaningless,” says André Veneman, director of sustainability at AkzoNobel. Many of the industry’s investments in low-carbon technologies that are marginally financially viable also will likely be delayed, he says. Without a strong carbon price, the underlying push to cleantech in the EU will come only from the price of oil, Veneman adds.


Veneman and other experts say that a carbon price of between $68 and $135 is required if industry as a whole is to be forced to shift onto a new low-carbon footing.


Yvo de Boer, special global adviser for climate change and sustainability for KPMG—an audit, tax, and advisory firm—and former executive secretary for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, is pushing for a much higher price of about $200 per allowance. “That’s the kind of level that drives the price signals that we really need,” de Boer recently told EurActiv, an EU policy website.


Analysts agree that the primary reason for the EU’s low carbon price is the economic recession, which has suppressed demand for emissions allowances because production is down, thus manufacturers’ emissions are too.


A secondary reason for the low carbon price is the high number of “generous” exemptions for the scheme handed out to energy-intensive industries, says Marcus Ferdinand, senior market analyst for Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, a carbon market information provider. In 2018, just over 50% of the 2.1 billion metric tons of allowances provided by the EU will be sold through auctions with the remainder due to be allocated free of charge.


Emissions credits generated from the worldwide implementation of cleantech projects agreed to under the Kyoto protocol also can be sold on the EU emissions trading market and have added further to the market’s oversupply.


A recent report by ECN, an independent Dutch energy research organization, forecasts that without intervention this situation will result in zero emissions reduction from the trading scheme until at least 2020. This lack of reduction is because the oversupply of allowances is projected to last through 2025. The market is on course to have a surplus of 2.2 billion allowances in 2018, equivalent to a full year of emissions by industry, ECN states.


For its part, the commission in a recent report accepts that the allowance surplus “in the longer term could affect the ability of the EU emissions trading scheme to meet more demanding emission reduction targets cost-effectively.”


There are already signs that the low carbon price is having an impact on the functioning of the trading scheme. The German government withdrew 4 million allowances from an auction on Jan. 18 because they failed to meet the reserve price. With the drivers for oversupply showing no signs of abatement, analysts expect more of these auctions to fail.


The commission had planned to generate billions of dollars by auctioning carbon allowances and then reinvest the money to subsidize cleantech development programs including renewable energy projects. As a consequence of the low price, the available funds are now far smaller than expected, and the scale and number of projects funded has dropped.


To bump up the price of carbon, the commission has proposed to postpone—or backload—until 2019 or 2020 some 900 million emissions allowances originally tagged for distribution from 2018 to 2018. “It seems that the commission is trying to save the market from falling apart,” Ferdinand says.


The catch is that to start backloading the commission must first gain legal approval from both the European Council, which represents all of the governments of EU member states, and the European Parliament. That won’t be easy because a small number of EU countries, led by Poland, are enjoying the low carbon price and are resisting the commission’s proposal. Poland is the world’s 10th-largest consumer of coal—the fuel that generates the most carbon emissions—and is even considering building new coal-fired power stations.


Investment by the EU to help Poland transition to a more sustainable energy mix could be money well spent both environmentally and politically, according to de Boer. But time is running out, and on Feb. 19 a leading committee within the European Parliament will vote on whether to allow backloading.


“It’s make-or-break day, as the following policy process is very much dependent on the outcome of that vote,” Ferdinand says. If the lawmakers reject backloading, the price of carbon will languish between $5.40 and $6.70 per metric ton, he says. However, in the unlikely event that the vote goes the commission’s way, he adds, the price would go slightly higher.


Not everyone is unhappy with the way things are turning out. The current situation suits the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), Europe’s main chemical industry association. Three years ago CEFIC was warning that the EU emissions trading scheme was the single biggest threat to the competitiveness of the region’s chemical industry. That threat has fallen, the group notes, in line with the price of carbon.


“Although the price is lower, it is still a cost that does not exist outside the EU,” says Peter Botschek, director of energy for CEFIC. The EU’s unilateral emissions trading scheme is anticompetitive and a high carbon price would drive manufacturing out of the region, he says. But even if backloading takes place, there are so many flaws in the market that it would “hardly have an impact,” Botschek adds. A global emissions trading scheme, on the other hand, would be acceptable to the EU chemical industry, he says.


But a range of experts outside the chemical industry is keen to see the commission apply measures to push up the price of carbon. Among them is David Cook, executive ambassador for Stockholm-based The Natural Step, a sustainable development organization that advises firms, including chemical companies, on how to be sustainable.


To download a PDF of this article, visit cenm. ag/carbontrade2.


“A low carbon price is not a good thing,” Cook says. The chemical sector’s backing of a low carbon price is shortsighted, he says, as the issue of climate change and sustainable manufacturing “is not going to go away.” With a low carbon price, the transition to clean energy “ultimately will still happen but will take longer than it should,” هو يقول.


In the short term, carbon trading in Europe is still generating cash to fund cleantech projects, albeit at a smaller scale than if the carbon price had been higher. In December 2018, the commission awarded more than $1.6 billion to cofund 23 innovative renewable energy demonstration projects. The money was generated directly from the sale of 200 million emissions allowances under the commission’s New Entrants Reserve 300 (NER300) funding program, which sets aside 300 million allowances for subsidizing installations of innovative renewable energy technology and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Private investors are set to contribute another $2.7 billion to the projects.


It’s “a ‘Robin Hood’ mechanism that makes polluters pay for large-scale demonstration of new low-carbon technologies,” says EU Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard, referring to the legendary English outlaw who robbed the rich to feed the poor.


With the carbon price five times less than it was a few years ago, there is one-fifth of the money available for these projects, Ferdinand says. Projects funded by NER300 cover a wide range of renewable technologies, including advanced biofuels, concentrated solar power, geothermal power, and wind power.


CCS, a highly capital intensive but unproven approach to combating CO 2 emissions from sources such as power stations, missed out on funding from NER300 in December because projects were not advanced enough to meet commission criteria or because they lacked partner funding.


The commission has a further 100 million carbon allowances that it plans to sell on the market in the next few years so that it can invest in a second wave of renewable technology projects. The commission will set aside almost $400 million for CCS projects from this second auction round.


The development of low-carbon and even zero-carbon technologies will be slowed by the low carbon price, however, and that is a problem, says Michael Carus, managing director of Nova Institute, a privately owned firm in Hürth, Germany, providing expertise on low-carbon technologies. In particular, the move to develop chemical processes based on the use of CO 2 as a feedstock will be adversely affected by the low carbon price just when it is starting to emerge as a viable commercial option, Carus says.


But one analysis indicates that the situation isn’t so grim. A study by KPMG shows that investment in cleantech has not slowed despite the presence of a relatively low carbon price and economic downturn, says Barend van Bergen, head of KPMG’s Global Center of Excellence for Climate Change & الاستدامة. “The other good news is the spread of carbon regimes. It’s not just the EU anymore. It’s spreading into Canada, India, Brazil, China, New Zealand, and Australia,” van Bergen says. But, he points out, “we still need a significantly higher carbon price before there is a mainstream shift to renewables.”


If the EU carbon price continues to flounder, other EU member states, such as the Netherlands, could take action at the national level, van Bergen says. For example, countries might establish a carbon tax.


The U. K. already has taken such steps. It introduced a tax of $7.90 for each metric ton of CO 2 generated in the production of electricity consumed by certain industries including chemicals. This price has been applied to top up the low price of the EU emissions trading scheme, says Nick Sturgeon, director for energy, trade, and competitiveness at the Chemical Industries Association, a U. K. industry group. The U. K. chemical industry is lobbying hard to attain exemptions from this carbon tax, Sturgeon says.


Although the U. K. has introduced a carbon tax, it is still an unusual approach. Many governments around the world that are seeking to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in a meaningful way still consider carbon emissions trading as the only viable option.


Officials in countries including South Korea and Australia have been in detailed discussions with EU officials to determine the best options for setting up their national carbon emissions trading schemes. Although Europe’s scheme is awash with oversupply of allowances, its problems have come at just the right time to ensure that developers of emerging schemes can learn from the EU’s experience.

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